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Introduction
Dependency and the absence of a well functioning 
energy market are the most challenging relics of the 
Soviet legacy in the Baltic States. In the electricity 
sector, Lithuania’s, Latvia’s and Estonia’s grids are 
all linked to the post-Soviet, Eastern system. In the 
gas sector, all three countries have no option other 
than to import gas exclusively from Gazprom. 
Major vulnerability is caused by a specific 
circumstance in this regard: the single supplier, or 
regulator in the case of electricity, tends to follow 
a strategy of ‘energy diplomacy’, rather than the 
principles of a market economy. The obligation 
to pay a considerably higher price for natural gas 
than many other member states of the European 
Union (EU), the avoidance of the Baltic States as 
transit countries, and blackmail regarding possible 
supply disruptions are clear consequences of this 
situation.   
The governments of the Baltic States1 claim 
that the close connections between the Kremlin’s 
foreign policy and the ‘selective’ supply and 
pricing strategies of Gazprom create a dependence 
on supplies from Russia that jeopardises their 
national security (Spruds 2009). A centralised 
gas sector in Russia and the attitude of the 
highest Russian officials towards energy affairs 
indicate that the politicisation of energy affairs 
will not cease in the foreseeable future. In other 
words, if nothing is done, the threat of increasing 
energy prices, supply disruptions and blackmail 
will continue, at least under the current Russian 
government. This will further challenge the 
political independence of the Baltic States. 
In light of these concerns, the Baltic States are 
looking for possibilities to change the situation. 
Some aspects of the Baltic States’ energy security 
may be covered by national measures. Other 
threats can be addressed by developing regional 
cooperation and implementing joint energy 
1 As energy security is crucial for the national security of the 
state, the governments of the Baltic States pay great attention 
to the development of this sector. Thus, in this paper the terms 
‘Baltic States’ interests’, ‘Baltic States’ concerns’ etc. mean the 
interests, concerns, and positions of the state (i.e. the interests or 
official positions of the Baltic States’ governments).  
infrastructure projects. However, this paper 
presumes that without the contribution of the EU, 
the Baltic States will not escape their ‘energy 
island’ status for years. Their negotiating power 
and financial capacities are simply too weak for 
negotiations with partners such as the Russian 
government and Russian companies such as 
Gazprom, the United Energy System (UES) of 
Russia or Transneft. It may be assumed that the 
Baltic States have a genuine interest in a stronger 
EU energy policy and support ideas such as the 
creation of a European Energy Community 
(Andoura et al. 2010). To have a meaningful 
impact on the EU-Russia energy cooperation 
structure and content is among the most important 
aspects in this regard.2
In seeking EU support in energy affairs, 
the Baltic States face a twofold problem. First, 
supranational EU involvement in energy affairs 
is a quite recent phenomenon. Therefore it has 
to be constantly promoted, developed, and 
improved. Second, the EU member states are 
significantly divided over how to deal with energy 
risks, what should be the priorities of the EU 
internal and external energy policy dimensions. 
For instance, countries, which are interested in 
participating in Russian oil and gas production 
and export projects3 develop and sustain bilateral 
energy relations with Moscow, even if this means 
deviating from a position of solidarity with other 
EU member states. Those, which heavily depend 
on Russian imports, favour a tougher stance 
towards Russian energy policy. They ask for 
deeper integration of the European energy market 
and the development of an external EU energy 
policy, but face the challenge of persuading 
sceptics of the need for this. Assuming the high 
importance of a coordinated and institutionalised 
EU external energy policy for the Baltic States, 
this paper focuses on their motives and strategies 
2 The current institutional structure of the EU-Russian Energy 
Dialogue is presented in Figure 1 (see annexe).
3 Examples of such investments include those made by Germany’s 
Ruhrgas towards the modernisation of Gazprom’s gas-export 
infrastructure, the Gazprom and French Total agreement to 
jointly design, finance, construct and operate the Shtokman 
gas field. The joint venture South Stream AG, equally owned 
by Gazprom and Italian Eni and created to execute the South 
Stream pipeline project, can be also mentioned in this regard. 
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6
in shaping the EU’s strategic position towards the 
main energy supplier, Russia. 
Many European and Baltic researchers focus 
their recent analyses on EU energy policy, EU-
Russia energy relations, or the energy security 
interests of the Baltic States in general. However, 
none of them has ever tried to unite these aspects 
and provide a deeper analysis of the Baltic States’ 
approach towards the most important aspect 
of the external dimension of the common EU 
energy policy: EU-Russia energy cooperation. 
This study, concentrating on current events and 
the latest tendencies, at least partially attempts to 
compensate this gap. First of all, it aims to explain 
the paradoxical situation, whereby Lithuania, 
Latvia and Estonia, whose dependence on 
Gazprom gas is striking, all advocate for measures, 
which are in fact impeding the development of 
closer EU-Russia energy ties. In discussing the 
Baltic States’ expectations in relation to EU-
Russia energy cooperation, this study explains 
major historical, political and economic reasons 
for such a ‘hostile’ approach towards Russia 
and its energy companies, and presents ways in 
which the Baltic States hope to safeguard their 
energy security. The second aim of this study is 
to provide an overview of the alternative energy 
supply infrastructure development projects, which 
could mitigate the negative consequences of the 
Baltic States’ dependence, and to analyse the 
Baltic States’ interests in developing the external 
dimension of the common EU energy policy.
It is presumed that both individually and even 
jointly the Baltic States are too small for bilateral 
negotiations with suppliers, of which Russian 
companies and the Russian government are first 
and foremost. In other words, at least in the near 
future, the Baltic States have no choice other 
than to seek the replacement of bilateral relations 
with Russia (or Gazprom) with multilateral EU-
Russia negotiations regarding supply volumes, 
prices, investments, etc. Against this background 
the research question of this paper is: why and in 
which direction do the Baltic States want to shape 
the development of an EU energy policy? This 
paper neither proposes a magic formula nor has 
the ambition to become a handbook for Baltic and 
EU energy policy decisions shapers and makers. 
However, it explains the reasons for the Baltic 
States’ concerns and argues that the absence of 
a common understanding of the principles of 
‘solidarity’ and ‘reciprocity’ has a negative impact 
both on EU energy policy development and 
the Baltic States’ energy security. By assessing 
the potential of the Baltic States’ priorities and 
contrasting them with the views and positions of 
Western governments, experts and private firms, 
this paper argues that without a coherent external 
EU energy policy dimension – meaning first of 
all a clearly defined and commonly implemented 
policy towards Russia – the EU will remain the 
weaker partner in relations with Moscow and the 
Baltic States will continue to play the role of an 
easy target for divide-and-rule policies. 
In seeking to explain the Baltic States’ 
arguments, this paper starts with a presentation 
of their import dependence on Russia and their 
inability to overcome this dependence with either 
national or regional efforts (chapter 1). The second 
part focuses on the development of a common 
EU energy policy, which is perceived as the main 
instrument for securing a stable and sufficient 
supply of energy resources to the Baltic States. The 
creation of a common EU energy market (first of 
all in the gas and electricity sectors), as well as an 
increase in the level of gas supply diversification, 
will be analysed as instruments, which would limit 
the dominance of Russian companies (chapter 2). 
The last chapter seeks to explain the importance 
of ‘consumer solidarity’ inside the EU and of the 
‘reciprocity clause’ in EU relations with Gazprom, 
both of which are considered to be the Baltic 
States’ priorities in EU-Russia energy relations 
(chapter 3). 
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I Challenges and opportunities for 
the Baltic States’ energy sector
This chapter is concerned with the existing 
problems in the Baltic States’ energy sector. It also 
gives a brief overview and assessment of the main 
projects, which have been implemented so far to 
diminish the energy insecurities of the region. It 
will be shown that without political and financial 
support from the EU, the Baltic States will not be 
able to achieve their key objectives. 
Overview of the major risks and 
vulnerabilities 
Until the end of 2009, the three Baltic States had 
quite a diverse energy mix. In Estonia, the energy 
mix was dominated by the use of oil shale, in Latvia 
by the use of hydro resources and in Lithuania by 
the use of nuclear energy. In addition, all three states 
complemented these energy sources with biofuel, 
wind energy and, of course, with imports of natural 
gas and oil products (Rudzikas 2006). Despite the 
significant import dependencies in both the oil and 
gas sectors, the Baltic States can not be treated as 
purely energy importing and consuming countries. 
The presence of an oil refinery in Mazeikiai, 
import/export terminals for oil and oil products in 
Butinge and Klaipeda (Lithuania), Ventspils, Riga 
and Liepaja (Latvia), and Tallinn and Sillamae 
(Estonia), as well as a gas transit pipeline through 
Lithuania to Kaliningrad, mitigate at least some of 
the import dependency related risks. 
However, in 2002 the Lithuanian government 
and the European Commission (EC) reached an 
agreement regarding the decommissioning of the 
Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant by the end of 2009. 
At the time, Ignalina not only provided ~80% 
of Lithuania’s domestic electricity requirements 
but also exported electricity to the other Baltic 
States. In addition, over a five year period starting 
in 2016, Estonia will have to comply with EU 
emissions regulations on large combustion power 
plants, meaning that the country will practically 
LITHUANIA LATVIA ESTONIA EU 27 
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Solids 215 355 346 83 82 76 3255 2634 2835 320065 318268 334149
Oil 2746 2941 3220 1376 1732 2051 1090 1405 1600 665514 674035 690801
Natural gas 2476 3663 4418 1358 1594 1909 800 973 896 444804 462439 487045
Nuclear 2666 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 257360 245217 243715
Electricity -255 24 -71 185 172 181 -138 -151 -102 973 1496 1466
Renewable 758 843 1015 1718 1910 2127 621 697 670 122689 152646 170461
Total 8606 7826 8929 4720 5490 6344 5627 5559 5899 1811406 1854101 1927639
A
s %
 in
 
gr
os
s i
nl
an
d 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n Solids 2.5 4.5 3.9 1.8 1.5 1.2 57.8 47.4 48.1 17.7 17.2 17.3
Oil 31.9 37.6 36.1 29.2 31.5 32.3 19.4 25.3 27.1 36.7 36.4 35.8
Natural gas 28.8 46.8 49.5 28.8 29.0 30.1 14.2 17.5 15.2 24.6 24.9 25.3
Nuclear 31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14.2 13.2 12.6
Renewable 8.8 10.8 11.4 36.4 34.8 33.5 11 12.5 11.4 6.8 8.2 8.8
N
et
 im
po
rts
 
(k
to
e)
Solids 190 345 339 76 79 72 27 119 129 126702 153315 181784
Oil 2677 2872 3147 1662 2057 2443 867 1556 1773 589611 623018 669687
Natural gas 2492 3663 4418 1434 1594 1909 800 973 896 256828 294227 358047
Electricity -255 24 -71 185 172 181 -138 -151 -102 973 1496 1466
Total 5096 6882 7808 2783 3252 3878 1463 2401 2602 975298 1073937 1213468
Import dependency 
(%) 58.3 86.1 85.6 55.9 55.9 57.6 25.5 42.1 42.9 52.4 56.3 61.2 
Table 1. Baseline scenario of the main energy balance indicators
Source: Capros et al. 2008. 
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have to cease the production of electricity in oil 
shale-fired power plants. As a consequence, the 
Baltic States will have to replace both their nuclear 
and oil shale energy with imported electricity or 
gas, which will be required for the generation of 
electricity. Due to the huge sums of money that 
will subsequently need to be wired to external 
energy suppliers, instead of remaining within 
these countries to support local energy producers, 
these developments will negatively influence the 
Baltic States’ economies and sharply increase 
their dependency on energy imports. This latter 
tendency is clearly illustrated by table 1.
Since gaining political independence, the 
Baltic States have been dependent on Russia 
for almost 100% of their gas supplies. A huge 
share of the internally consumed or refined oil 
is also imported from either Russia or Belarus, 
in the case of oil products (Janeliunas, 2009). 
Additionally, in the electricity sector, the Baltic 
States have to rely on Russian ‘back-up’ capacities. 
Subsequently, analysts from the European Centre 
for International Political Economy (ECIPE) 
conclude that the Baltic States are least able to 
respond to gas supply cuts (see annexe, figure 2). 
In other words, the analysis of indicators (such as 
the share of gas in primary energy consumption, 
the import dependency on Russian gas, the level 
of retail gas market concentration, the rank of 
‘effectiveness of antimonopoly policy’) has 
demonstrated that the Baltic States are extremely 
vulnerable to Gazprom’s policies (Dreyer et al. 
2010: 1). The main reasons for the Baltic States’ 
energy insecurity may be summarised as follows:
Dependency on a single supplier1.  (see graph 
1): In the gas sector, Gazprom enjoys a so called 
complete ‘vertical monopoly’ on the Baltic 
States’ market. As a consequence, the supply 
of natural gas may be limited or stopped4 or its 
price may be lifted at any time without any real 
negotiations.5 It is even more dangerous that 
4 Since 1991, Moscow has suspended the gas supply to Eastern 
European countries for political reasons 40 (!) times (Kolesinskas 
2008).
5 Some analysts claim that despite this dependence, consumers in 
the Baltic States still benefit from gas prices below the EU-27 
average. This is, however, not always true. In January 2010, for 
instance, the gas price in Lithuania was $US 310 for 1000 cubic 
the Baltic States’ dependence may be used to 
influence their internal political and economic 
decisions.6 Practically, this means that 
Moscow may use these instruments to create 
direct political or economic pressure, or as a 
means of sanctioning.7 In the electricity sector, 
the Baltic States are integrated only into the 
‘UES of Russia’ network. This means that in 
the case of a short term electricity deficit they 
possess only one option – to rely on a system 
dominated by Russian electricity providers 
(Aalto 2008: 9). In the oil sector, dependency 
risks are also relevant, due to the fact that the 
Baltic States possess only very limited local 
oil resources. 
Absence of energy interconnections with 2. 
the energy systems of Northern and 
Western Europe (see annexe, figures 3 and 
4): Theoretically, energy resources such as 
gas and electricity could be supplied to the 
Baltic States from elsewhere, for instance, 
from the Nordic States. However, usage of 
these politically ‘safe’ supplies is practically 
impossible due to serious infrastructural 
constraints. In other words, there is physically 
no gas pipeline uniting the Baltic States with 
Western or Northern Europe. Integration into 
meters, while Western consumers were purchasing natural gas 
on the so called ‘spot’ market for merely $US 200 for 1000 cubic 
meters. Besides this, due to the shutdown of the Ignalina Nuclear 
Power Plant in Lithuania and the problems with oil shale and the 
transfer to a free electricity market in Estonia, the need for gas 
in the Baltic States will increase. Due to the lack of alternative 
resources, which could complement gas as the replacement for 
nuclear energy and oil shale, Gazprom uses this opportunity to 
increase the gas price for the Baltic States. 
6 According to some analysts, dependence on Russian energy 
supplies is one of the strongest tools Russia currently possesses 
to influence the policies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The 
Baltic States are concerned that Russia may use their energy 
dependency to interfere in their domestic affairs or force them to 
make foreign policy concessions (Mae 2009).
7 For instance, in January 2003, Russia suspended oil deliveries 
to the Latvian port of Ventspils. Analysts have noted that this 
embargo coincided perfectly with Latvia’s refusal to sell its oil 
transit company Ventspils Nafta to the Russian oil company 
Transneft. Between 1998 and 2000, Transneft cut off oil supplies 
no less than nine times in order to stop the Lithuanians from 
selling their port, pipeline and refinery to the American company 
Williams International (Hamilton 2008). In July 2006, deliveries 
of crude oil through the Druzhba pipeline to the ‘Mažeikiu 
Nafta’ refinery were also stopped after Russia failed to gain 
control over this energy infrastructure asset (Whist 2008: 23).
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the world’s biggest energy grid, Continental 
Europe (formerly the Union for the Co-
ordination of Transmission of Electricity, 
UCTE), is not yet completed.8 
Slow growth of renewable energy 3. 
consumption: Officially, it is expected that by 
2020 the share of renewable energy resources 
to final energy consumption will be 23% in 
Lithuania, 25% in Estonia and 42% in Latvia 
(Europe’s energy portal 2009). However, other 
experts (see table 1) say that these figures are 
unrealistic and that the use of renewable energy 
is growing too slowly. The main reasons for this 
are the high costs of renewable technologies, the 
lack of stable financial support systems, little 
technological experience and an unsettled legal 
base (Piebalgs 2007). In other words, a further 
increase in renewable resource consumption 
requires further research and high up-front 
investments. However, even economically 
8  As of July 2009, the work of the „Continental Europe“ regional 
group (formerly UCTE), as well as ATSOI, BALTSO, ETSO, 
NORDEL and UKTSOA, has been fully integrated into the 
European Network of Transmission System Operators for 
Electricity (ENTSO-E). Nevertheless, the principle goal of 
synchronisation (the integration of Baltic energy grids into the 
European energy network) remains. For more information on 
ENTSO-E and „Continental Europe“ energy grid see: https://
www.entsoe.eu/index.php?id=10, accessed 10 September 2010.
viable projects face administrative hurdles, 
as those to be involved with the planning, 
development, operations or promotion of 
renewable energy projects lack the required 
levels of education and training. 
Low energy efficiency:4.  The energy intensity of 
industry in the Baltic States is one of the highest 
in the EU. Energy efficiency in buildings, the 
transport sector and district heating systems 
are extremely low. This stems from the use 
of out-dated Soviet technologies, insufficient 
investment and a weak savings culture. The 
biggest challenges towards improving the 
Baltic States’ energy efficiency are related 
to the lack of knowledge and experience in 
common property management, low incomes 
and the fear of taking out loans. The inability 
of residents to agree and make common 
decisions, the lack of trust and knowledge in 
the realisation of successful projects and the 
unattractive financing conditions for energy 
efficiency investments also play a significant 
role in this regard (Janeliunas 2009).
Graph 1. Russian gas as a share of primary energy supply (2006)
Source: Noël 2008. 
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The progress of the Baltic States in the 
electricity, gas and oil sectors
It seems that the Baltic States’ governments 
recognise the major risks in the energy sector quite 
well and are trying to mitigate these vulnerabilities. 
As far as the electricity sector is concerned, 
the Baltic States have achieved some limited 
progress both in planning the construction of a 
new common Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) to be 
built in Lithuania and integrating the Lithuanian, 
Latvian and Estonian electricity systems into the 
“Continental Europe” regional group. Progress 
on the development of a common NPP has been 
registered since the end of 2006, when Lithuanian, 
Latvian and Estonian energy companies conducted 
a feasibility study and concluded that the project 
could go ahead (Spruds 2009). In March 2007, 
the Lithuanian and Polish Prime Ministers signed 
a Communiqué, which gave the green light for 
Poland’s participation in the project. In 2009, the 
Lithuanian government announced a tender to find 
a strategic investor for a new NPP and parallel 
negotiations with the two bidders presenting the 
best offers were planned for 2010.9 Besides this, 
in January 2007, the three Baltic States’ energy 
companies completed the 350 MW Estlink project, 
uniting the Baltic electricity systems with the 
Finnish one. In January 2009, they succeeded in 
reaching the EU target of allocating €175 million 
for the construction of the NordBalt energy link, 
which will connect the Baltic States with Sweden. 
All these strategically important projects, which 
also include the second branch of Estlink and 
the Lithuanian-Polish energy bridge LitPolLink, 
have real prospects for being implemented, as in 
June 2009, eight Baltic Sea member states signed 
a Memorandum of Understanding on the Baltic 
Energy Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP). 
This plan envisages concrete measures, which 
have to be taken in order to better integrate the 
Baltic States’ energy systems into the wider EU 
energy networks (Europa Press Releases 2009). 
Besides the construction of the new NPP and 
9 For more information on NPP and electricity interconnection 
projects see: http://www.enmin.lt/en/activity/veiklos_kryptys/
strateginiai_projektai/, accessed 5 October 2010.
integration into the wider energy grid, there are 
also other plans on how to improve the provision 
of electricity in the Baltic States (for details see 
annexe, chart 1). In this regard, the Baltic States 
are keen to fully liberalise their markets and 
to use the potential of the post-Soviet ‘UES of 
Russia’ more effectively. As long as the electricity 
produced by the Ignalina NPP has been the 
cheapest in the region, there has been no need for 
the Baltic States to look for import possibilities, 
but now the situation has changed. Although 
other domestic power plants (consuming gas, coal 
and oil products) could potentially produce as 
much electricity as the countries need, importing 
electricity from Russia, Ukraine and, in the case of 
Lithuania, even from the hydro-energy rich Latvia 
or Estonia (which still fires oil-shale for energy 
production) is considerably cheaper (Mae 2009). 
Therefore consumers have become more interested 
in covering their energy needs through imports 
and producers are now keen to replace the Ignalina 
NPP. As a consequence, the idea of having a free 
electricity market in the Baltic States has gained 
new momentum. At the beginning of 2010, with 
the creation of BaltPool, the free market became 
operational in Lithuania and few months later, in 
Estonia. Based on the NordPool rules, BaltPool is 
seen to be the first step on the way to a common 
electricity market, which is expected to emerge in 
the Baltic States in the coming years. According 
to some officials from the Lithuanian Ministry 
of Energy, even without full integration into the 
Continental Europe regional group the Baltic 
States would this way have the possibility of using 
the NordPool Spot market model for electricity 
exchange with their Eastern neighbours.10 
Despite some progress, there are experts 
who are less optimistic in their assessments 
of the most ambitious projects of the Baltic 
States in the electricity sector. For instance, a 
representative from the Lithuanian Ministry of 
Energy highlights that the Scandinavian countries 
themselves currently import electricity from 
Russia. Therefore expectations that the electricity 
10 Further information on the creation of the “BaltPool“ system, 
which is based on the “NordPool” model, is available at http://
ec.europa.eu/energy/infrastructure/bemip_en.htm, accessed 5 
October 2010.
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supply will be diversified through the Estlink or 
NordBalt interconnections may not be met.11 An 
expert from the German Institute of Economic 
Research underlines that no NPP has ever been 
built by a private investor in Europe, as the Baltic 
States plan to proceed. Besides this, the costs 
and risks associated with nuclear waste storage 
make the project less attractive to both society 
and investors, and put the construction process in 
permanent danger.12 To summarise, progress in the 
relatively ‘easy’ electricity sector may take much 
more time than expected.13 
The implementation of projects strengthening 
independence in the gas sector is even more 
complicated (for details see annexe, chart 1). 
Governments and private investors are dubious 
about further investments (in Liquefied Natural 
Gas (LNG) terminals, gas storages, pipelines), 
as Gazprom not only supplies 100% of the gas 
consumed in the Baltic States, but also controls, 
whether directly or through subsidiaries, both 
crucial infrastructure objects (pipelines and 
storage facilities), as well as the gas distribution 
companies (see annexe, figures 5 and 6 for a 
graphic representation of the EU’s and Baltic 
States’ dependence on Russian energy resources).14 
Therefore even if there was a political decision 
to build an LNG terminal, underground gas 
storage facilities or a gas interconnection with 
Poland, Gazprom, together with its partners, 
11 Nemunas Biknius, Chief specialist of Energy Resources, 
Electricity and Heat division at the Ministry of Energy, interview 
by author, 16 November 2009, Vilnius, Lithuania.
12 Dr. Petra Opitz, Manager at Deutsches Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW econ), interview by author, 18 
December 2009, Berlin, Germany.
13 Proof of this is the current failure to contract (through a formal 
competition process) the ‘strategic investor’, which would 
construct and operate the proposed NPP in Lithuania. 
14 In Lithuania, Gazprom owns 37% of shares in the gas importer 
and distributor Lietuvos dujos (Gazprom’s strategic partner 
E.ON Ruhrgas International owns 39%). The second largest gas 
importer and distributor Dujotekana is under informal Gazprom 
influence (through private businessmen closely associated with 
the Kremlin). In Latvia, Gazprom owns 34% of shares in the 
single gas importer and distributor Latvijas Gaze (E.ON Ruhrgas 
International owns 47%). In Estonia, Gazprom owns 34% of 
shares in the main gas importer and distributor Eesti Gaze (E.ON 
Ruhrgas International owns 33%). Further information may be 
obtained at:  http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/GP_EU_
en_.pdf, accessed 5 October 2010.
would still have the final word as to whether or 
not the transportation of this ‘alternative’ gas 
through the pipelines should be allowed.15 Taking 
into consideration Gazprom’s approach towards 
competition, an agreement with Gazprom or its 
subsidiaries may be very difficult to reach. 
On the other hand, there are also some positive 
developments in the gas sector. First of all, a large 
share of Russian oil and oil products is transported 
to the EU either by tankers via the Baltic ports 
or pipelines over the Baltic States’ soil. Thus, 
the fulfilment of Russia’s global energy supply 
obligations requires considerable cooperation 
in the Baltic Sea region and prevents Russia 
from making politically motivated decisions in 
the energy sector. Second, even the Gazprom 
subsidiaries in the Baltic States may approve some 
form of supply route diversification, for instance, 
the supply of gas to Lithuania, and maybe even 
Poland, via Latvian territory, since this would 
allow them to avoid the risks associated with 
the transit of gas through Belarus.16 Finally, the 
governments of the Baltic States have at least 
theoretical leverage to diminish some of their risks 
by exploiting the so called ‘Kaliningrad card’.17 
Of course, the pipelines going through Lithuania 
(see annexe, figure 4) are controlled by companies 
loyal to Gazprom, which may not agree to satisfy 
the ‘political’ requirements of the Lithuanian 
government. The ‘Kaliningrad card’ may also 
lose its significance if the Nord Stream branch to 
Kaliningrad is built or a local nuclear power plant 
is constructed (as the Kaliningrad region consumes 
most of its gas for electricity production). In any 
case, as long as the Nord Stream plans are not 
implemented, the ‘Kaliningrad card’ remains in 
the Baltic States’ hands.18 
15 Not to mention the investments required for such projects. 
Given the economic crises currently facing the governments of 
the Baltic States it seems hardly possible that they will find an 
opportunity to invest in energy infrastructure development.
16 Nemunas Biknius, Chief specialist of Energy Resources, 
Electricity and Heat division at the Ministry of Energy, interview 
by author 16 November 2009, Vilnius, Lithuania.
17 The Russian region of Kaliningrad is geographically separated 
from the rest of Russia and does not have a self-sufficient energy 
sector. It is therefore supplied with gas via Lithuanian territory.
18 Nemunas Biknius, Chief specialist of Energy Resources, 
Electricity and Heat division at the Ministry of Energy, interview 
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In trying to diminish the risks associated 
with the strategies of Gazprom and the Russian 
government19 in the gas sector, the Baltic States 
are also insisting on the construction of new 
pipelines to transport gas to the traditional 
destinations in the EU. For instance, the “Amber 
project”, if implemented, could carry Russian 
gas to Europe through the Baltic States, thus 
avoiding Belarus.20 The Baltic States also support 
the Nabucco and White Stream projects, as they 
are aimed at supplementing Russian gas with gas 
from the Caspian Sea region. It is understood in 
the region that both Nabucco and White Stream 
will hardly reach consumers in the Baltic States. 
Nevertheless, the diversification of supply to the 
European market as a whole should discipline 
monopolists and put a limit on gas prices in 
Europe. Consequently, this would strengthen the 
negotiating position of consumers and increase 
the overall amount of gas supplied to the EU. For 
the Baltic States this could make it possible to 
re-import so called ‘surplus gas’ through Poland 
from Denmark, Germany, Norway, Qatar (in the 
case that the LNG terminal in Poland is built) or 
even Russia. 
In order to benefit from a diversified supply of 
gas to the EU market, the Baltic States are first of 
all striving to implement the gas interconnection 
projects, which would unite Estonia and Finland, 
and Lithuania and Poland, as well as to accelerate 
the Baltic Interconnector project, which would 
allow the import of gas from Norway via 
Finland.21 Additionally, the Baltic States are also 
by author 16 November 2009, Vilnius, Lithuania.
19 Assuming that the Russian government’s strategy is to use energy 
resources as a tool for achieving political objectives. In this 
study, the strategy and policy of Russian energy companies and 
the government are considered to be very much interdependent. 
20 The “Amber project” envisions the laying of a pipeline across 
the Tver, Novgorod and Pskov oblasts in Russia and then 
through Latvia and Lithuania to Poland, where it would be 
reconnected to the Yamal–Europe pipeline. Proponents have 
claimed that the Amber pipeline would cost only half as much as 
Nord Stream, would be shorter, and would have a less significant 
environmental impact. Critics of the proposal say that it would 
be more expensive for suppliers over the long term, as the main 
aim of the project is in fact, to reduce transit costs.
21 Finland is also interested in having a link with the Baltic States, 
as this would allow it to make use of Latvia’s underground 
storage facilities. The geological structure in Finland makes 
domestic storage very expensive to build.
discussing the possibility of constructing an LNG 
terminal in one of the Baltic States’ ports. If such a 
terminal is built, large LNG vessels could be used 
to supply LNG from Qatar, Nigeria or the Barents 
Sea. An alternative possibility is to use small LNG 
tankers, which sell on the LNG brought to the 
existing terminals in Western Europe (Ramboll 
Group 2009). Another possibility, which could at 
least allow the Baltic States to deal with short term 
risks, would be to construct a second underground 
gas storage or to increase the storage capacity 
of the facility located in Inchukalns, Latvia.22 
These storages could also be connected to the 
gas pipelines running to Europe. However, due 
to a very complex set of reasons, none of these 
projects has yet advanced past the completion of 
the feasibility studies. 
The Baltic States’ dependence on Russia in the 
oil sector is not as threatening as in the gas sector. 
On the one hand, all three Baltic States are net oil 
importers, depending on Russia for approximately 
90% of their supply. On the other hand, however, 
as was noted before, the Russian crude oil pipeline 
system is connected to the Baltic States’ ports and 
the refinery in Mazeikiai, Lithuania. Due to the 
lack of refining and shipping capacities, Russian 
companies are dependent on these capabilities.23 
As a consequence of this cooperation, some oil and 
oil products end up remaining in the Baltic States. 
At the same time, however, Russia is currently 
constructing new terminals (e.g. in Primorsk) 
and pipelines on its soil and is thus increasingly 
avoiding this transit through the Baltic States.24 
If Moscow succeeds in this endeavour, the Baltic 
States will lose both their leverage vis-à-vis Russia 
(Sleivyte 2008) and their income from transit fees, 
which represent 4-5% of GDP and up to 10% if 
transport services are included (Mauring/Schaer 
22 At present, the Inchukalns storage facility has a capacity of 2.3 
bcm. This facility not only holds the gas reserves of Latvia, 
Lithuania and Estonia, but also those of Russia. The volume 
of Latvian underground gas storages could be increased up to a 
total of 20 bcm (KPMG Advisory 2008).
23 For example, the Ventspils terminal handles shipments of crude 
oil and petroleum products from Russia as it is linked to Russia’s 
oil extraction fields and transportation routes (Ventspils 2009). 
24 A recently opened port in Ust-Luga (St. Petersburg district) and 
the “Baltic Pipeline System” are the most evident elements of 
such a strategy.
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2006). On the other hand, the terminals located 
on their soil allow for the import of oil from 
destinations other than Russia.25 For instance, 
the Kazmunaigaz Company uses some of these 
terminals for the export of Kazakh oil, which is 
transported to the ports by rail. Therefore it may 
be concluded that despite Russian efforts, due 
to their traditional intermediary role and current 
capacities in the refining and transportation 
processes, the Baltic States will most probably 
retain the possibility of diversifying their oil 
supply and even of using their oil infrastructure 
development projects as a catalyst for intensifying 
cooperation in other sectors.26 
Besides these direct reasons (the absence of 
interconnections, the dominance of Gazprom in 
the gas sector and poor governmental investment 
capacity), there are also other, more indirect factors, 
which to date have prevented the Baltic States 
from effectively countering their energy security 
related risks. For instance, the construction of 
the new NPP in Lithuania was postponed several 
times, due to internal mismanagement27 and the 
complicated relations with the Polish, Latvian and 
other partners (The Lithuania Tribune 2009: 17). 
There is also no excuse for the situation, which 
forced the Lithuanian government to appeal to 
the European Commission in order to convince 
Latvia to cooperate in energy affairs (as it was in 
the case of energy link to Sweden28). Even after 
the European Commission interfered, cooperation 
remained technical, on the level of operators, 
rather than orientated towards long term goals, 
such as a firm agreement that only one new NPP 
25 For example, after Russian companies stopped supplying 
oil through the “Druzhba” pipeline in 2006, oil to Lithuania 
(“Mazeikiu nafta” refinery) was imported from Venezuela (BNS 
2006). 
26 The best example of this is the Lithuanian-Polish cooperation 
around the “Mazeikiu nafta” refinery, which contributed to some 
progress on the Odessa-Brody-Plotsk-Gdansk pipeline, which 
aims to ensure the import of oil from the Caspian Sea region.
27 The national investor “LEO LT” was created to complete the 
project, only to be subsequently abolished.
28 After the European Commission stated its potential financial 
support for the “NordBalt” project, the Latvian and Lithuanian 
governments engaged in a competition concerning the place 
from which the energy cable linking Sweden should be built. 
will be built in the region.29 Despite the fact that 
the Polish power company PSE Operator is one 
of the partners in constructing an energy bridge 
between Lithuania and Poland and the new NPP in 
Lithuania, the Polish government is worried about 
the competition, which local energy producers 
may face if these projects are completed. 
As a consequence, the Polish government is 
simultaneously considering the construction of 
several NPPs in Poland, negotiating the import 
of electricity from German NPPs and examining 
the possibility of supporting the construction of an 
NPP in the Kaliningrad region. Outdated energy 
infrastructure is another challenge. In the case of 
the construction of LitPolLink, the upgrading of 
Lithuanian and Polish domestic power grids would 
cost €95 million and €371 million respectively. 
Competing NPP projects in Belarus and 
Kaliningrad may only deepen the reservations of 
potential partners to invest into the modernisation 
of Baltic electricity grids and new infrastructure 
objects (The Lithuania Tribune 2009: 5). 
To sum up, being more than once ‘punished’ 
by Moscow for their growing independence 
in foreign-policy making30, the Baltic States 
remain vulnerable in the gas and electricity 
sectors. National and regional cooperation efforts 
to mitigate these vulnerabilities appear to be 
important but not sufficient. Indeed, the last 10-
15 years of action within this framework have not 
resulted in reliable solutions. There is a risk that 
in dealing only bilaterally at the governmental 
level, or leaving it up to private companies to 
implement essential energy security projects, may 
result in a further deterioration of the situation. 
In other words, it may put the ability to provide a 
29 Nemunas Biknius, Chief specialist of Energy Resources, 
Electricity and Heat division at the Ministry of Energy, interview 
by author, 16 November 2009, Vilnius, Lithuania.
30 For instance, the Russian state-owned company “Transneft” 
attempted to gain control of the “Mazeikiu nafta” refinery in 
Lithuania and the Ventspils oil-export terminal in Latvia in 
2002. When the two governments refused to sell their stakes to 
“Transneft”, Moscow sharply cut oil deliveries, forcing Ventspils 
to obtain oil by rail. Deliveries of oil to the Lithuanian refinery 
“Mazeikiu nafta” were cut after the refinery was sold to the 
Polish company “PKN Orlen” instead of the Russian “Lukoil”. 
Other notorious examples are the gas conflicts between Russia 
and Ukraine and the increase in gas prices for Azerbaijan, 
Belarus and Moldova (Spruds 2009).
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stable supply of electricity at risk, further increase 
dependence on supplies from Russia and raise the 
price of energy for consumers. 
However, with their reliance on a deepening of 
European integration in energy affairs, the Baltic 
States can not afford to remain passive spectators. 
In other words, they do not have a choice other 
than to be the ones generating innovative ideas and 
proposing pilot projects and reasoned initiatives. 
If not, ‘common’ EU policy will not necessarily 
mean ‘beneficial’ policy. For instance, although the 
liberalisation of the EU energy market was agreed, 
it was not implemented, nor was it extended to the 
creation of an external dimension. Moreover, it 
did not result in the creation of crisis management 
instruments or EU strategic energy reserves. Thus, 
the Baltic States should define their priorities 
and lead, together with their partners, a broader 
discussion on EU energy policy. The next chapter 
will explore how the Baltic States are attempting 
to streamline the EU common energy policy in 
order to make it more effective.
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II The Baltic agenda for the common 
EU energy policy
Officials and scholars in the Baltic States argue that 
by exploiting their current competences the EU 
institutions could play a crucial role in the creation of 
a common EU energy market, strengthening the EU’s 
energy ties with ‘alternative’ energy suppliers, and 
negotiating the conditions of a strategic partnership 
with Russia in the energy sector. The majority of 
Western experts and officials, however, doubt the 
efficiency of involving supranational EU institutions 
in such matters. As a German expert puts it “the EC has 
a mandate in competition, infrastructure and climate 
policies, it can foster energy efficiency projects or 
promote renewable energy resources. But it does not 
posses a mandate to develop a comprehensive energy 
policy”31. Against this background the Baltic States 
face a twofold challenge: 1) to convince sceptics that 
a common EU energy policy can already be effective 
today; 2) to promote the further development of a 
common EU energy policy by arguing for the creation 
of common electricity and gas markets, and the 
strengthening of the external dimension. Both aspects 
are crucial, as important achievements are possible 
even without big structural changes in the EU acquis 
communautaire. For instance, political support from 
the EU could trigger the construction of important 
infrastructure objects and also encourage member 
states to continue reforms despite the pressure from 
monopolists. At the same time, amendments to the 
legal base and the creation of new legally binding 
commitments could ensure that once started, this 
process becomes irreversible and complements the 
energy security of each and every EU member state. 
The following two sub-chapters will discuss the 
Baltic States’ priorities for the development of an EU 
common energy policy. These priorities include the 
creation of common EU gas and electricity markets 
and the diversification of gas supply. These are two 
areas in which the involvement of supranational EU 
institutions could, according to the Baltic States, 
bring a clear added value even in the short term.
31 Dr. Petra Opitz, Manager at DIW econ, interview by author, 18 
December 2009, Berlin, Germany.
Creation of common EU gas and electricity 
markets 
The Baltic States’ efforts to prevent politically 
motivated supply disruptions and constant price 
lifting are pointless, if the common EU electricity 
and gas markets do not work properly or if the Baltic 
States’ energy sector stays outside this market. 
Being a part of the European market would mean 
a diversified supply, while staying outside means 
playing into the monopolists hands, i.e. paying 
their price without negotiations, experiencing the 
pressure to sell energy infrastructure objects, and 
facing blackmail and disruptions due to political 
reasons or outdated infrastructure in the East (see 
chapter 1). The provisions of the Lisbon Treaty 
and more detailed EU regulations on the creation 
of a common EU energy market (e.g. third 
Legislative Energy & Gas Package) provide some 
hope and allow the Baltic States to have at least 
minor leverage against the growing influence of 
Gazprom. But this is not sufficient – the resulting 
common market is of no less importance than the 
process of its creation. The question remains as 
to why the process is so slow and how the Baltic 
States envision speeding it up. 
The provisions laid down in the Lisbon 
Treaty are neither the first, nor the only attempt 
to employ transnational instruments to strengthen 
the EU member states’ energy security.32 In 
2006, for instance, member states agreed on the 
priority projects inside the Trans-European energy 
networks (TEN-E).33 The problem has been, 
however, that the construction of these networks 
has not received enough support from the EU 
institutions. In this regard, the Baltic States first 
of all argue for political support, which would be 
very helpful in attracting private investors, and 
the establishment of more favourable conditions 
for the development of the networks (e.g. for the 
adoption of fast approval procedures). According 
32 According to the recently ratified Lisbon Treaty, competences in 
the field of energy policy are shared between the EU institutions 
and the member states (Official Journal of the European Union 
2007: 21).
33 It was agreed that 9 major axes for electricity, 64 projects of 
‘common interest’ and 32 projects of ‘European interest’ be 
included. The agreement also concerns the 6 major gas axes, 122 
projects of common interest, 10 projects of European interest in 
the gas sector.
SP
ES
 P
ol
ic
y 
Pa
pe
rs
 2
01
1
16
to a researcher from the Netherlands Institute 
of International Relations Clingendael, despite 
energy affairs being traditionally left for private 
companies to deal with, the latest attitude of the 
EU institutions represents a rift in EU thinking 
and favours the Baltic States’ interests.34
Even with such political support, the creation 
of single, effective EU gas and electricity 
markets will remain little more than a vision if 
no investments are made on the ground. In other 
words, the creation of, or integration into, bigger 
regional or EU markets requires budget allocations 
for electricity and gas interconnections and the 
modernisation of energy grids and pipelines, 
amongst other things. However, the problem 
is that even after the ratification of the Lisbon 
Treaty, as regards financial matters, the member 
states continue to play a key role in the EU’s 
energy affairs. This means that the costs of new 
energy infrastructure projects are mainly being 
covered either by national budgets or by private 
companies. The role of the EU is limited to the 
creation of a framework, which would stimulate 
private investment. This approach is problematic 
for the Baltic States, whose governments are not 
able to allocate sufficient resources and where 
companies are not willing to invest into financially 
risky projects, whether on their own or sharing the 
burden among several parties. 
It is more than clear that EU financial 
mechanisms will not be used to make a significant 
contribution to the development of regional energy 
infrastructure projects if this idea is opposed by 
the largest EU member states. This fact explains 
the Baltic States’ efforts to engage in extensive 
political dialogue with Germany, the UK and the 
Nordic States. Though they are far from making 
concrete achievements in the energy sector, the 
Baltic States’ expectations are not completely 
unfounded. As highlighted by a German expert, 
Germany, for instance “is a country with the 
overall market guided philosophy and creation of 
the common free electricity and common market 
34 Christof van Agt, Senior researcher at the Clingendael 
International Energy Progarmme, interview by author, 2 March 
2010, The Hague, Netherlands.
could be one of its goals”35. On the other hand, 
a German researcher claims that in reality, the 
creation of a single EU energy market is more 
a rhetorical than a real priority for the German 
government. The main reason for this lies in the 
fact that German energy companies are not very 
keen on allowing outsiders to enter the German 
market. In addition, the German government 
is reluctant to finance the construction of 
interconnecting pipelines as part of the European 
Economic Recovery Plan, arguing that this would 
help encourage countries to free-ride instead of 
pursuing the projects on their own.36 Nevertheless, 
as recent examples such as the creation of bail-
out packages for Ireland and Greece and the 
discussions surrounding the European financial 
stability facility fund show, in the case of a really 
serious crisis, leading EU member states usually 
prefer to become active. This provides hope for 
the Baltic States’ diplomats in their bargaining 
with the leading EU countries. 
The financial aspects of creating an EU energy 
market are governed by the Decision „Laying 
down guidelines for trans-European energy 
networks and repealing Decision 96/391/EC 
and Decision No 1229/2003/EC“37 (European 
Parliament and Council 2006). Initially, for the 
TEN-Energy projects, the EU Commission, 
with the Parliament’s support, proposed €340 
million for the financial period 2007-2013. The 
Council, however, insisted on a drastic reduction 
of these funds. The final agreement between the 
Council and the Parliament on the new TEN-E 
35 Dr. Petra Opitz, Manager at DIW econ, interview by author, 18 
December 2009, Berlin, Germany.
36 Marcel Viëtor, Program Officer for Energy and Climate at the 
German Council on Foreign Relations (Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Auswärtige Politik, DGAP), interview by author, 10 December 
2009, Berlin, Germany. 
37 This document defines the conditions, methods and procedures 
for granting Community financial aid to projects of common 
interest in the field of the trans-European transport and energy 
networks (Inforse-Europe 2008). It is also mentioned that 
financing for the TEN projects can be complemented by structural 
fund assistance, aid from the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
or contributions from the private sector (ibid.). Despite the fact 
that financial support from the Community may serve only as 
a catalyst (with member states still required to cover the bulk 
of the costs), this option for financing the energy infrastructure 
development and integration into the EU energy market projects 
is the most desirable for the Baltic States. 
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financial framework provided only €155 million, 
which represents 45% of the amount originally 
proposed (Soave 2008). This very minor sum for 
energy infrastructure projects is about to be spent 
on supporting the feasibility studies of projects 
considered to be of ‘European’ or ‘common’ 
interest, according to the Guidelines for TEN-E 
from 2006 (European Commission 2007). 
However, the attention that leading EU member 
states pay to financial matters, discussed earlier, 
is not the only challenge in this regard. Another 
problem is that despite the fact that the Baltic 
States have no energy interconnections with 
other EU member states, very few of the planned 
energy links important to the Baltic States are 
included on the list of EU priority projects (the 
most important of these are listed in table 2). In 
other words, even a greater awareness on the part 
of the most powerful EU governments may only 
result in greater EU support to the energy grids of 
the Western (but not Central) EU member states. 
Thus, the Baltic States must once again try to 
solve a twofold task: to increase the EU financial 
allocations for the creation of well functioning 
common EU electricity and gas markets and to 
ensure that the biggest investments are made on 
their soil.
The indifference of EU member states towards 
the creation of effective, liberal and common 
electricity and gas markets may be clearly 
illustrated by the fact that, out of 27 countries, 
25 have not implemented the directives on the 
liberalisation of the electricity and gas markets 
correctly. However, concerns about the possible 
‘free riding’ are not the only reason for not 
investing into interconnections. Investments 
are hindered by the right feeling that common 
effective EU electricity and gas markets will not 
function properly until the goals of the EU internal 
coherence and solidarity are overshadowed by 
ELECTRICITY GAS
Priority projects Projects of European interest Priority projects Projects of European interest
Denmark - Germany - 
Baltic Ring
Poland - Lithuania link, 
including necessary 
reinforcement of the Polish 
electricity network and the 
Poland - Germany profile in 
order to enable participation 
in the internal energy market
United Kingdom 
- northern 
continental 
Europe, 
including the 
Netherlands, 
Belgium, 
Denmark, 
Sweden and 
Germany 
- Poland 
- Lithuania - 
Latvia - Estonia - 
Finland -Russia
North European gas pipeline, 
Yamal - Europe gas pipeline, 
Natural gas pipeline linking 
Denmark, Germany and 
Sweden
France - Belgium – 
Netherlands –Germany
Borders of Italy with 
France, Austria, Slovenia 
and Switzerland
United Kingdom - 
continental and northern 
Europe
Submarine cable Finland 
-Estonia (Estlink)
Algeria - Spain - Italy - France 
-northern continental Europe
France - Spain – Portugal Germany - Poland - Czech 
Republic - Slovakia – 
Austria - Hungary - Slovenia
Caspian Sea countries - 
Middle East-European Union 
(The Nabucco pipeline)
Greece - Balkan countries 
- UCTE System
Ireland - United Kingdom
Mediterranean Member 
States - Mediterranean 
electricity ring
LNG terminals in Belgium, 
France, Spain, Portugal and 
Italy
Underground storage in Spain, 
Portugal, Italy, Greece and the 
Baltic Sea region
Mediterranean Member States 
- East Mediterranean gas ring
Source: European Parliament and Council 2006.
Table 2. TEN-E projects relevant for the energy security of the Baltic States
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the individual member states’ preoccupation to 
maintain good relations with external energy 
players (whether real or potential electricity and 
gas suppliers). Due to this the third dimension of 
the Baltic States efforts concerns external factors, 
notably Moscow’s resistance towards the creation 
of a free market in the Baltic region and the EU. In 
this regard the Baltic States point to the paradoxical 
situation that Western countries do nothing in 
order to ‘convince’ Gazprom to shift the Eastern 
border of the EU’s gas market from the Western to 
the Eastern borders of Poland. Until this so called 
‘gas-up’ happens on Poland’s Western borders, 
the Baltic States are not considered by Gazprom 
to be a part of the ‘European market’. This means 
that even if the necessary €343-778 million are 
allocated and the gas systems of Lithuania and 
Poland are interconnected, Poland or other gas 
companies in Western Europe still may not be 
allowed to re-export Russian gas back to the 
Baltic States. In this regard, it may be concluded 
that the development of an external EU energy 
policy dimension corresponds to the Baltic States’ 
interests to the same extent as the creation of the 
common market does. 
 Matching the objectives of a common market 
with the aims of a common EU external energy 
policy may, however, be not so simple. As a 
Dutch researcher rightly claims, the ongoing 
debate on the external energy policy dimension is 
about deepening the intervention of governments 
either directly (e.g. investing into Nabucco) or 
indirectly (via fiscal measures or support for 
entrepreneurial activities in certain regions). 
 Analysts and politicians on both the EU and 
Russian sides rightly note that this sort of initiative 
(as for instance the unbundling foreseen in the 
third EU energy package) actually contradicts 
the free market philosophy. The Baltic States, 
being among the most prominent supporters of 
a securely functioning free common market, 
have a vested interest in finding and promoting a 
solution to this dilemma. One possibility would 
be the creation of a legal base, which includes 
new provisions on ‘co-dependency’. This concept 
acknowledges the consistency of the external EU 
energy policy with the rules of the internal market, 
but goes beyond these if the free market does not 
work in external relations with non market energy 
suppliers. In practical terms it means a repetition 
of the pattern set by the European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom), i.e. the creation of a similar 
‘community’ for the gas sector. Since gas sector 
security issues do not compare to the much higher 
security standards that the trade and transport of 
nuclear materials requires, this currently appears 
to be an unlikely development. On the other hand, 
the Declaration on the creation of a European 
Energy Community (Andoura et al. 2010), which 
will be discussed below in more detail, is very 
well equipped to serve the Baltic States’ political 
goals. 
Gas supply diversification
Many Western experts consider the diversification 
of the supply of energy resources only to make 
sense if it is economically feasible. For instance, 
it is argued that if it is cheaper to import electricity 
from Russia than from another country (e.g. 
Finland), electricity should be imported from 
Russia. If Russian gas is cheaper than Norwegian 
gas or LNG, then again, Russian imports should 
prevail. Otherwise, consumers will have to 
share the burden of expensive projects by being 
forced to accept much higher energy prices. 
 Moreover, it is claimed that although 
diversification is the ‘motto’ of the day for 
politicians, the practical need for such strategies 
should not be overestimated. Indeed, there are 
other, EU-internal and therefore, more feasible 
means by which to increase supply security. 
 Nevertheless, the Baltic States continue to argue 
for the strengthening of the external EU energy 
policy dimension, which would help to diversify 
supply and break existing monopolies. There are 
irresistible arguments for doing so even today, 
when Western energy companies and scholars 
debate the possibilities of how to cut the price 
of wind and nuclear energy, how to increase the 
consumption of biomass, hydro- and geothermal 
energy, how to develop solar and hydrogen energy, 
and how to improve the technologies of horizontal 
drilling or rock fracturing in order to increase the 
production of ‘unconventional’ gas and oil.
The functioning of a free EU energy market 
would open up the possibility of gas and electricity 
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exchange among the EU member states. For 
the Baltic States this would make it possible to 
import gas and electricity from other EU member 
states and to rely on their networks for the supply 
of imports from more remote sources. As a 
consequence, prices would become negotiable. On 
the other hand, at least the partial diversification 
away from Russian gas and the pipelines through 
which it is supplied is possible even in the short 
term, without integration into the common EU 
market. Striving for this, the Baltic States rely on 
two important factors: 1) the fact that, officially, 
strengthening cooperation with both traditional 
and alternative energy suppliers is one of the 
EU’s external energy policy priorities and 2) no 
EU country has given up the desire to diversify its 
supply of gas. In this regard, the starting point for 
the Baltic States in the gas sector is the construction 
of the Southern Corridor (Trans-Caspian, the 
Nabucco and the White Stream pipelines), as well 
as the contracting of suppliers in the Caspian Sea 
region (see annexe, figures 7). The Baltic States are 
also keen on preserving the independence and the 
speeding-up of the modernisation of the Ukrainian 
pipeline system, as well as on the construction of 
an interconnection between Poland and Lithuania. 
In this vein, it is important to ask what has already 
been done in this regard and what are the prospects 
of achieving more. 
In 2009, after seven years of debate, the 
European Commission proposed €250 million in 
initial funding for the Nabucco pipeline. In the 
same year, Turkey and four EU member states 
signed a deal allowing work on this pipeline to 
start (Lobjakas 2009). In early 2011, Commission 
President Jose Manuel Barroso and Energy 
Commissioner, Günther Öttinger, personally 
visited Baku and Ashgabat confirming the EU’s 
determination to gain access to Caspian energy 
resources and attempting to specify the scope of 
the proposed Southern Corridor together with 
Azerbaijan (the only reliable gas supplier for the 
Southern Corridor route). Nevertheless, problems 
related to the construction of Nabucco remain 
fundamental. Although the launch of the Southern 
Corridor on the basis of Azeri gas is at present a 
near-certainty, it has not yet been established via 
which route or under what conditions will the gas 
be transmitted to the EU. In practice, Azerbaijan 
will decide on the scope and route of the corridor, 
on the basis of its own calculations (Jarosiewicz 
2011). At the same time, however, the corridor 
is bringing various other conflicting interests 
to the fore: as a strategic transit hub, Turkey is 
pressing the EU to accept its EU membership 
application; Germany, Italy and France question 
the necessity of Nabucco; and Russia is about to 
implement competing projects (Liuhto 2009). The 
White Stream and the Trans-Caspian projects are 
experiencing similar problems and are even less 
advanced than Nabucco. Thus, the Baltic States’ 
diplomatic efforts in this area have not resulted in 
any tangible results so far.
The prospects of advancing the diversification 
of gas imports to the Baltic States from other 
regions are even vaguer. The construction 
of new undersea pipelines is not under 
consideration and the shipping of LNG 
 is not feasible due to the absence of LNG import 
facilities in or around the Baltic States. Poland 
has taken some practical steps in this direction 
by implementing an LNG terminal construction 
project in Swinoujscie and has already signed a 
deal with Qatar’s Qatargas Operating Company to 
deliver about 1.4 bcm of gas through the terminal 
starting in 2014. However, for the Baltic States to 
benefit from this, a completely new 820 kilometre 
pipeline would have to be built from Poland 
to Lithuania. Therefore several ‘internal’ LNG 
infrastructure development projects are also being 
discussed. The Lithuanian government is currently 
exploring the idea of constructing an LNG import 
terminal in Klaipeda, Latvia has plans for an LNG 
terminal in Ventspils and Estonia envisions the 
construction of a terminal in Paldiski (Esmerk 
2009). However, the costs of the LNG import 
terminals, as well as other economic and financial 
factors (the tight market, the price of LNG), are 
forcing the Baltic States to look for more creative 
solutions. 
A significant share of the obstacles to gas 
supply diversification, however, are related to 
the Gazprom factor. For instance, Gazprom 
has announced its desire to participate in the 
construction of the Nabucco pipeline (Interfax 
2006), which could contradict the concept 
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of diversification and prevent some potential 
investors from investing into this project. 
 Even greater damage may be caused by the fact 
that Gazprom has managed to sign long term 
contracts on all possible supplies of gas from gas 
producing countries such as Turkmenistan and 
Azerbaijan. In this way, Gazprom has managed 
not only to make a profit from transit fees, sustain 
its own energy exports to the EU and even develop 
plans for serving China’s growing energy needs, 
but also to prevent direct cooperation between the 
EU and Central Asia in the energy sector (Burns/
Houman 2009). In this context, it is important 
to keep in mind Russia’s strategy of signing 
bilateral agreements with potential Nabucco 
transit countries regarding their participation 
in competing projects and its ambitions to enter 
the LNG market. Finally, it should be recognised 
that the EU does not have too many instruments 
to prevent LNG from becoming just another 
‘pipe’, which once again may become dominated 
by Gazprom. This could easily happen if the 
Russian guided Gas Exporting Countries Forum 
(GECF) becomes stronger and turns into an LNG 
cartel. The Baltic States’ tactic of engaging the 
EU institutions in this competition or at least in 
negotiations with Gazprom over alternative supply 
options has not yet brought about any significant 
results. 
To sum up, the lack of will at the European and 
national level, insufficient financial mechanisms 
and active external resistance serve as serious 
obstacles to the creation of common electricity and 
gas markets and the diversification of supply. At 
the same time, there is no foolproof prescription 
on how to overcome these structural problems. 
Nevertheless, the Baltic States will most probably 
continue to require that the Union does everything 
possible in order to extend the provisions of the 
common market beyond its current borders as 
soon as possible. They will also continue to insist 
on the development of the external dimension 
of the EU common energy policy, which is so 
crucial for the diversification of supply. The joint 
Declaration on the creation of a European Energy 
Community by Jerzy Buzek, President of the 
European Parliament, and Jacques Delors reads: 
“Europe needs a stronger, deeper, common energy 
policy” (Andoura et al. 2010). In the wake of 
this initiative, the Baltic States will try to secure 
political support for any other proposal suggesting 
a response to Gazprom’s dominance. It is the 
Baltic States’ task to ensure that similar proposals 
find a place on the EU’s political and economic 
agenda.
What the Baltics want is that the EU stands up 
for its members and prevents such developments 
from entering long term contracts that other 
members consider problematic. Therefore the next 
chapter will focus on the principle of ‘solidarity’ 
which is essential but so far has not been fully 
implemented. ‘Consumer solidarity’ has not 
become a concept found in multilateral energy 
instruments, such as those related to the external 
dimension of common EU energy policy, or in 
secondary EU legislation on energy affairs. This 
is a situation, which the Baltic States are trying 
to amend. It also focuses on the Baltic States’ 
tactic of questioning the wisdom of a policy based 
on denying access for undertakings from third 
countries that do not reciprocate by allowing 
market access to their own national systems. Thus, 
the development of a unified approach towards 
internal solidarity and reciprocity between the EU 
and Russia, as the EU’s largest external supplier of 
fossil fuels, are at the centre of the third chapter.  
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III The Baltic States’ priorities for EU-
Russia energy cooperation
In 2009, Russia withdrew its commitment to 
provisionally apply the Energy Charter Treaty 
(ECT), an agreement regulating investment 
protection and transit in the energy sector in 
Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS). In addition, Russia is neither a 
member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
nor a signatory to any other international economic 
agreement (Dreyer et al. 2010: 1). In other words, 
there is no international legal instrument to limit 
Moscow’s actions in the field of energy policy. 
As a consequence, the Russian government 
may use national energy ‘champions’ for the 
implementation of its foreign and security policy 
without obstacles, for instance, by streamlining 
energy resource export and pricing policy. Such a 
strategy would negatively affect the effectiveness 
of a common EU energy policy and is a constant 
source of worry for the governments of the Baltic 
States. This chapter will focus on the Baltic States’ 
agenda towards shaping possible internal and 
external EU responses, which, if successful, could 
lead to a situation where relations with Russia do 
not determine the conditions of access to Russian 
gas. 
Shaping ‘consumer solidarity’ 
It is widely recognised that without internal 
coherence, an effective external energy policy 
dimension is practically impossible. It is also a fact 
that today, the EU fails to speak with a ‘common 
voice’ in energy affairs (Braghiroli/Carta 2008). 
Long term bilateral energy agreements, such as Nord 
Stream between Russia and Germany, South Stream 
between Italy, Bulgaria and Russia and various 
LNG supply contracts between Spain, France and 
Algeria, indicate that big member states continue 
to view energy security as a national policy issue. A 
German expert claims that some countries recently 
started to understand that they are gaining little out 
of the strategy to ‘play’ bilaterally with Russia. 
 Nevertheless, politically and economically, EU 
member states continue to favour the use of bilateral 
and ‘non-institutionalised’ (i.e. not regulated by an 
‘all inclusive’ international treaty) relations with 
external suppliers, as long as they feel that their 
own bargaining power is greater or equal to that 
of their suppliers. What is even worse is that the 
Baltic States’ voice arguing for a strengthening of 
EU energy cooperation with the Caspian and Black 
Sea region countries is going almost unheard. 
Recognising their limited influence in bilateral 
talks and the absence of means to manage energy 
supply related crises, the Baltic States’ governments 
have discovered another tactic on how to deal with 
energy insecurity. The main element of this is to 
argue for the construction and strengthening of EU 
solidarity in energy affairs (Vaiciunas 2009). 
The Baltic States have drawn an interesting 
conclusion regarding the main causes of missing 
EU solidarity. It seems that the main constraint 
is not the opposition of some member states 
to the concept of ‘solidarity’ in energy affairs, 
but different perceptions inside the EU on what 
‘energy solidarity’ actually means. Consequently, 
building a consensus has turned into the main task 
for the Baltic States. These various perceptions 
are determined by the different ‘starting positions’ 
of the EU member states. Respective starting 
positions are influenced by factors such as the 
different attitudes towards the liberalisation of the 
energy market, different geographical locations, 
different energy mixes and levels of dependence, 
and different historical experiences.38 Therefore 
some EU member states perceive ‘solidarity’ first 
of all as a short term action in times of crisis that 
is, as an ability and willingness to support other 
EU member states in case of short term supply 
disruptions. German researchers for instance 
argue that the solidarity clause is important for 
the German government, but Germany’s energy 
companies do not maintain any considerable 
interest in investing into unprofitable, solely 
politically motivated projects.39 Moreover, some 
38 Marcel Viëtor, Program Officer for Energy and Climate at 
DGAP, interview by author, 10 December 2009, Berlin, 
Germany; Dr. Franziska Holz, Researcher at the Department 
Energy, Transportation, Environment, German Institute for 
Economic Research, interview by author, 8 December 2009, 
Berlin, Germany.
39 Jonas Grätz, Doctoral Fellow, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
Russia/CIS Division, interview by author, 15 December 2009, 
Berlin, Germany.
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experts underline the German government’s 
unwillingness to spend tax payers’ money on 
European interconnecting pipelines or energy 
bridges for reasons related only to the ‘security of 
supply’, in other words, with no regard for who 
will supply these pipelines or energy grids with 
gas or electricity.40 
40 Marcel Viëtor, Program Officer for Energy and Climate at DGAP, 
interview by author, 10 December 2009, Berlin, Germany.
However, for the countries of the CEE region 
‘solidarity’ means more than whether or not 
investments are made into concrete pipelines. 
Their strategic long term goals include the 
creation of a ‘harmonised energy policy’ towards 
external suppliers and transporters, the financing 
of key energy infrastructure projects from the 
EU budget, and even some type of ‘collective 
security’ commitments in the energy sector. 
Asking for solidarity, the Baltic States are trying 
Box 1: Examples of missing EU solidarity in energy affairs 
Case 1 – Nord Stream
Nord Stream is a gas pipeline that aims to link Russia and the European Union via the Baltic Sea. 
Nord Stream is a joint project between four major companies: Gazprom, BASF/Wintershall Holding 
AG, E.ON Ruhrgas AG and N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie. The pipeline will be 1,220 km long and will 
consist of two parallel lines with an annual capacity of around 55 bcm. Total investment in the offshore 
pipeline is projected at €7.4 billion. Work on the project could only begin once those countries in 
whose exclusive economic zones the pipeline is routed had granted their permission. There was no 
doubt that Russia and Germany would issue such permission, but the Baltic States expected support 
from the Nordic countries. All the more so because Finland and Sweden had repeatedly expressed 
concern about the environmental impact of the project and Stockholm was additionally worried that 
the pipeline might be used by Russia as a good excuse for it to militarise the Baltic Sea. In addition, 
Denmark expressed its concern over the project‘s possible impact on Bornholm. Nevertheless, by 
the end of 2009, the governments of Denmark, Finland and Sweden had agreed to the construction 
of Nord Stream, despite all of these possible economic, political, ecological and technological risks. 
The fact that Helsinki obtained Moscow’s pledge that Russia would not increase export duties on 
unprocessed timber for one year demonstrated the circumstances under which the majority of the 
Nordic states accepted Nord Stream.
Case 2 – South Stream
The South Stream project was initiated by Russian Gazprom and Italian ENI in 2007. Subsequent 
bilateral diplomacy on the part of Gazprom managed to involve additional EU member states, namely 
Greece and Slovenia in the project and to secure the support of others, who could potentially benefit 
if the project is implemented. The Baltic States argue that the South Stream pipeline was initiated 
by Gazprom in order to control the flow of natural gas from the Caspian region and the Middle East 
to Europe. In other words, they fear that the EU may refuse to compete with Russia and may switch 
the gas supplies for Nabucco from Central Asia and the Caspian Region allowing Russia to transport 
Central Asian gas through the South Stream pipeline. Thus, if Russia succeeds in constructing South 
Stream, Gazprom will control the entire gas supply, at least to the Balkans and the CEE region 
a) from  Central Asia (by controlling South Stream) and b) from Middle Eastern countries (by 
“coordinating” supplies through GECF). To sum up, according to the Baltic States, if the countries 
joining South Stream and defecting from Nabucco in favour of South Stream (Austria, Hungary, 
Bulgaria) continue to base their energy policy only on opportunistic, economic calculations, Russia 
will be able to conceal the deficit of its own gas production without investing into energy efficiency 
and upstream infrastructure. 
Source: Information in the box was prepared using: Paszyc 2010.
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to upload to the EU their worries about the 
Kremlin’s national priority to strengthen Russia’s 
role in the world energy market. They argue that 
Moscow’s endeavour to gain state control over the 
pipelines, as well as the increasing role of Russian 
companies on the European energy market and 
Russia’s closer cooperation with South Korea, 
China and India on oil and gas matters, should 
be perceived as Russia’s ambition to become a 
leading energy superpower and to use this status 
to improve its standing in European and global 
politics. In other words, the Baltic States are 
afraid that Russian energy policy is becoming 
an instrument for a “new Russian imperialism” 
(Aalto 2008: 147). The main elements of this 
policy are: close control of foreign investment41; 
direct ownership of strategic energy assets42; 
increased participation in oil and gas exploration 
in the post-Soviet countries, in the Middle East 
as well as in Africa, Asia, and South America43; 
avoidance of transit countries44; concentration on 
long term gas supply contracts45; and the threat 
41 In recent years, several foreign companies – such as Shell, 
Mitsui, Mitsubishi and BP – have faced abuses in Russia. For 
more details see: http://www.forbes.com/2007/02/16/bp-russia-
energy-markets-equity_cn_0216markets11.html, accessed 5 
October 2010.
42 Russia insists that foreign companies wishing to take part in oil 
and gas exploration in Russia, should offer their Russian partners 
“something in exchange” on their home market (Mae 2009).
43 Russia is using outright ownership and joint ventures to control 
the supply, sale, and distribution of natural gas and is buying up 
major energy infrastructure assets, such as pipelines, refineries, 
electric grids, and ports. As of 2004, Gazprom had invested 
$US 2.6 billion in 23 major joint ventures and was buying up 
strategic infrastructure companies in Georgia, Hungary, and 
Ukraine. In 1998, Gazprom took over shares in “Topenergy”, a 
Bulgarian company dealing with the commercial distribution of 
gas (Amsterdam 2007).
44 Examples include the cancellation of the Yamal II pipeline that 
was to be built parallel to Yamal I through the territory of Belarus 
and Poland, the postponed Amber project, which was intended to 
create a pipeline running through the Baltic States and Poland, 
and the decision to build Nord Stream, which will bypass all the 
mentioned countries. The development of the Shtokman gas field 
is also partly driven by a strategy of avoiding transit countries, 
as gas from this field is to be transported directly to Russia’s gas 
customers either through a pipeline going via Russia and then 
through Nord Stream or as LNG from the LNG plant that is to 
be built just East of Murmansk. To reduce dependence on the 
use of the Baltic ports, Russia is currently building ports on the 
Northern shore of the Baltic Sea (Grajauskas 2008). 
45 Since the 1970s, the supply of natural gas has been based on 
long term contracts agreed for a period of 15-20 years, in order 
to diversify its gas market from Europe to Asia.46 
The Baltic States would like Western Europeans 
to recognise this threat as a common threat for 
the EU. However, so far, Western European states 
have not shared these concerns. 
Due to the different perceptions of ‘solidarity’, 
the latter has become a hardly achievable 
objective. For instance, it is widely recognised 
that Russian companies act as the ‘gatekeepers’ to 
the Russian energy market and that the disparity 
in the rules, which regulate the EU’s energy 
market on the one side and Russia’s on the other, 
is huge (Grajauskas 2008). However, according 
to both German and Dutch experts, there is only 
a small hope that the EU and Russia can reach a 
legally binding strategic agreement, because such 
an agreement would first require all EU member 
states to demonstrate solidarity with one another. 
Consensus between small and large member states 
is hardly possible, as the current state of the legal 
framework (or the absence of it) in fact satisfies 
the interests of the largest EU energy companies, 
who are the main players in the national energy 
sectors. German, French and Italian companies are 
competing with each other to receive better import 
conditions; they manage to negotiate access to 
the Russian upstream energy market and would 
not like to give up this power to, for instance, the 
European Commission.47 In this context, instead 
of engaging the Baltic States’ energy companies 
in negotiations with external suppliers, Westerners 
tend to criticise them for refusing to pay the 
energy infrastructure development related bills or 
for unfair attempts to profit from transit fees (as 
an opposing example of this, the Czech Republic’s 
to share the risks of costly pipeline construction and resource 
development between producers and consumers (Janeliunas 
2009).
46 For instance, in February 2009, Russia and China signed an 
intergovernmental agreement on the construction of a pipeline 
branch from Skovordino to the Chinese border and long term 
Russian oil supplies of 110 million barrels of crude per year 
from 2011 until 2030. On the other hand, Asian markets will 
be more expensive to develop, therefore Asian markets may be 
difficult for Russia to dominate (Ziegler 2009: 22).
47 Jonas Grätz, Doctoral Fellow, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
Russia/CIS Division, interview by author, 15 December 2009, 
Berlin, Germany.
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effective energy policy is often mentioned).48 As a 
practical manifestation of this ‘solidarity misuse’, 
the resistance to the construction of the Nord 
Stream pipeline is sometimes cited.49 
On the other hand, it should also be recognised 
that many Western European governments are 
going through a certain learning process and are 
gradually changing their attitudes towards the need 
for cooperation with the smaller EU members. 
Germany, for instance, was rather sceptical about 
the importance of having broader discussions and 
consensus inside the EU when energy agreements 
with Russia were at stake a few years ago.50 Today, 
German politicians are keener to take into account 
the attitudes of Poland and the Baltic countries. 
They tend to understand the necessity to include 
or at least to consult these countries before starting 
new cooperation initiatives with Russia.51 In 
this regard, Kai-Olaf Lang adopts a rather broad 
definition of solidarity in energy affairs claiming 
that today it means to give “support in overcoming 
the structural weaknesses and fragmentations of 
the market by providing (among other things) 
financial assistance to infrastructure projects”52. 
At the same time, however, this does not mean 
that the representatives of German companies will 
suddenly agree to solve the problems of those, who 
“haven’t done their homework”. Nevertheless, it 
is a much broader definition than the ‘short term 
action in time of crises’.53 
The Baltic States’ objective of reaching a 
consensus on the definition of ‘energy solidarity’ 
has become more plausible since the ratification 
of the Lisbon Treaty. After the completion of some 
48 Marcel Viëtor, Program Officer for Energy and Climate at DGAP, 
interview by author, 10 December 2009, Berlin, Germany.
49 According to this logic, it is claimed that the countries resisting 
the construction of the pipeline simply do not want to lose their 
incomes from gas transit and that this has nothing to do with 
“solidarity in energy affairs” as such (Hamilton 2008).
50 Martin Kremer, Senior Fellow, Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, Research Division EU Integration, interview by author, 
4 March 2010, Berlin, Germany.
51 Marcel Viëtor, Program Officer for Energy and Climate at DGAP, 
interview by author, 10 December 2009, Berlin, Germany.
52 Kai-Olaf Lang, Deputy Head of Research Division EU 
Integration, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, interview by 
author, 24 February 2010, Berlin, Germany.
53 Ibid.
important structural changes, Catherine Ashton, 
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy of the EU, now has the opportunity 
to become the first real strategic embodiment of 
the EU’s ‘single voice’ in terms of foreign and 
security policy, which also includes energy policy 
towards external suppliers. New Commissioners, 
in particular those responsible for energy and 
climate, are also starting to play a very important 
operational role in ensuring that the EU improves 
the functioning of the internal energy market and 
that external energy resources are secured by 
different means. All these developments represent 
a ‘new momentum’ and it would be inexcusable if 
the Baltic States fail to capture this and to provide 
solid arguments in favour of the EU putting in 
place a mechanism reflecting a real EU ‘solidarity’ 
in energy affairs. 
One of the main tasks for the Baltic States in 
the current circumstances is to build an appropriate 
explanation of why the EU bodies (Commission, 
external policy officials, structural funds, etc.) or 
‘national champions’ in the energy sector should 
contribute considerably to the energy security 
of the Baltics. The repetition of clichés such as 
‘EU solidarity’ and ‘energy island’ appears to 
be insufficient and therefore ineffective. It may 
be expected that in the future, the Baltic States 
will shift towards stressing solidarity as a factor 
implying political security and having a broader 
impact on stability in Europe. It may also be 
expected that the Baltic States will continue to 
explain the need for European investments, as 
local monopolies under companies closely aligned 
to Gazprom are not likely to make decisions to 
invest into additional energy infrastructure. To a 
certain extent, the Baltic States are right. Allowing 
Gazprom to takeover the Baltic States’ key energy 
assets was also the fault of EU market regulators.54 
Asking the EU to address the consequences of 
this and to prevent the abuse of these negative 
developments should now become the subject 
of internal or governmental debate. On the other 
hand, persuading the EU member states that the 
Baltic States’ interests (to prevent or even roll-
54 Christof van Agt, Senior researcher at the CIEP, interview by 
author, 2 March 2010, The Hague, Netherlands.
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back the monopolisation in energy affairs) are in 
line with those of the EU might become quite a 
complicated process. 
Promoting ‘reciprocity’ and legally binding 
agreements 
Russia supplies around 25-30% of total EU oil 
and gas consumption and serves as an important 
motor for Europe’s economic growth. By 2020 the 
EU will need to import approximately 600 bcm of 
gas, up from ~ 400 bcm today, and at least half of 
this demand will have to be sourced from Russia 
(Weafer 2009). Thus, the possibility that Russia 
will diversify its gas exports in the future is rightly 
considered to be a threat to the security of Europe’s 
gas supply (Poussenkova 2009: 9). In addition, as 
much as 90% of Russia’s total natural gas exports 
are delivered to the EU. Adding together exports 
of oil and other raw materials, Russia’s energy 
exports to the EU account for roughly 75% of 
Russia’s total export earnings and 40% of Russia’s 
budget receipts (Perret 2007). In other words, the 
European market is crucial for Russia and neither 
Asia nor North America will serve as a reliable 
alternative for Gazprom in the foreseeable future.55 
For many Western experts these circumstances 
imply a ‘mutual interdependence’. The problem is 
that the Baltic States think differently. 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia recognise that 
“even though ‘love’ between Russia and the EU 
most probably will not emerge, the necessity for 
cooperation will remain.”56 Nevertheless, they 
claim that real reciprocity in EU-Russia energy 
relations is missing, due to the unequal weight 
of the two players. In other words, Russia’s 
vulnerability compared to that of the EU is much 
lower, as it can shift current oil flows easily and 
gas exports are relatively unimportant as a source 
of revenue for the Kremlin (Grajauskas 2008). 
Besides this, relevant Russian actors are capable 
of acting in unison and strategically, while the 
EU is internally divided, both structurally and 
55 It is said that Russia will not be willing to miss out on the world’s 
biggest market (500 bcm/year) for relatively small Asian (China 
and India need 80 bcm/year) or North American (140 bcm/year) 
markets.
56 Marcel Viëtor, Program Officer for Energy and Climate at DGAP, 
interview by author, 10 December 2009, Berlin, Germany.
institutionally (Grätz 2009). Whereas Russian 
strategic energy interests are usually represented 
at the highest political level, with the President or 
government taking all strategic decisions, within 
the EU and its individual member states, they 
are represented at the level of private companies. 
This secures Russian companies the possibility to 
penetrate into the EU gas market. Russian firms 
usually not only succeed in securing a direct 
presence in the EU gas market, but also avoid 
competition57 and enjoy the highest profit margin 
(Aalto 2008: 60).58 
Another tendency, which worries the Baltic 
States, is the Russian endeavour to ‘coordinate’ the 
gas policies of the leading gas exporting countries 
through measures such as the construction of 
new pipeline projects, the ‘joint’ exploration and 
development of gas fields and the coordination 
of production schedules. As proof of this, in 
December 2008, Russia, Qatar and Iran formally 
inaugurated the GECF. Russia was the initiator 
of this forum and views it as a mechanism for 
attracting more investment funds into its gas 
industry and establishing Gazprom as a major 
global force in the LNG business (Weafer 2009). 
The GECF has since enlarged and now includes 
Algeria, Nigeria, Libya, Egypt, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Venezuela, Russia, Iran, Qatar, Oman, 
the United Arab Emirates, Brunei, Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Norway (as observer) (Hallouche 
2006). Members of the GECF exchange views 
and information on project developments, supply 
and demand balances, exploration, production 
and transportation costs, etc.59 As such, the GECF 
57 For instance, Moscow knows that some suppliers are seeking 
to open or broaden their access to Western markets. Therefore, 
Gazprom is trying to establish permanent control of markets, 
such as those of Hungary and the Balkans, that are strategically 
important for transportation before Caspian gas can reach them 
through the Nabucco pipeline (Socor 2008). 
58 The distribution business is one of the most profitable, while the 
upstream market requires the most investment.
59 While the weight of the forum in the global pipeline gas trade is 
not that pronounced (about 38%), its share of LNG production 
and exports was around 85% in 2007. In contrast, OPEC’s share 
of world oil supply is barely half that, at about 43%. However, 
it is still too early to say that a ‘gas cartel’ similar to OPEC has 
been created. The GECF membership has not been stable nor 
are all gas exporters members of the GECF. The behaviour of 
key members may have an important, but not always positive, 
impact on the GECF in the future. Finally, Russia can not afford 
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clashes with the ‘free market’ approach and 
competition policy promoted by the EU. Indeed, 
it makes contracting new exporters without 
consulting the dominant GECF member (Russia) 
extremely complicated. 
In this situation, the Baltic States have no 
other choice than to endeavour to convince their 
Western partners that it is necessary to continue 
negotiations with Russia regarding a new legally 
binding agreement in energy affairs. Even though 
in the short term, the Russian government may 
discard proposals coming from the EU, a so 
called ‘U-turn’ in Russian energy policy is not 
inconceivable. This assumption is based on the fact 
that Russia’s energy sector lacks investment and, 
what is even more important, that consumers do 
find alternatives to Russian energy resources. The 
construction of new LNG terminals, as well as the 
latest developments in the shale gas sector, have, 
in fact, already led to a change in the negotiating 
position of the Russian government and Gazprom 
in particular. Russian officials have become less 
assertive and more compliant to international 
policy frameworks, as they have come to 
understand a simple truth: the continuation of a 
strategy, which scares away both customers and 
investors, may result in the loss of a large portion 
of possible income from oil and gas production. 
The first practical consequences of this have 
already appeared. Gazprom previously claimed 
that it would supply the EU with 20% of its gas 
needs (the rest would be exported to China and the 
US), but now states that it wants to supply 30%. 
In other words, Gazprom has started worrying 
that it will lose even this 20% of the EU market. 
It seems that the Kremlin has become concerned 
by recent tendencies and may agree to some 
concessions.60 Due to this, it may be expected that 
Russia will soon become interested in reaching an 
agreement with the EU. The Baltic States should 
do everything in order to ensure that the EU does 
not miss the opportunity to conclude it. 
While discussing the content and the essence 
to fund a world-wide increase of LNG consumption nor does it 
want to (Kavalov et al. 2009).
60 Christof van Agt, Senior researcher at the CIEP, interview by 
author, 2 March 2010, The Hague, Netherlands.
of a potential EU-Russia agreement in the energy 
sector, the Baltic States would prefer that the EU 
does not walk away from the ECT as the integral, 
comprehensive energy agreement. However, 
in April 2009, Russian President Medvedev 
submitted a document entitled A Conceptual 
Approach to the New Legal Framework for 
Energy Cooperation (Goals and Principles) to 
the European Commission containing Moscow’s 
proposals for a new set of rules under which the 
global energy market should operate.61 The EU 
has indirectly responded to Russia’s proposal by 
reaffirming that regulation of the European market 
would be based on the ECT (Paszyc 2009). But 
the problem here is that both parties (the EU and 
Russia) are fairly limited in their ability to make 
compromises on their market views, especially 
in the gas sector. Western experts seem to agree 
that the proposals set out by the Russian President 
should be taken on board. The added value of 
negotiations would then be to remain involved and 
to preserve a space for further discussions with 
Russia. Westerners would most probably even 
accept the ‘return’ of Russia to this treaty without 
the strategically important Transit Protocol.62 
Article 7 (dealing with transit issues) of the ECT 
is quite wide and legally speaking sufficient to 
deal with transit issues.63 The Baltic States’ task is 
to find and propose solutions in this complicated 
situation. 
As Russia’s objection makes proceeding with 
the ECT an extremely complicated task, one 
feasible solution (however, not yet articulated even 
61 This document is sometimes also called ‘Medvedev’s Concept’ 
and proposes rules which run counter to the liberalisation of the 
EU energy market planned by the European Commission and 
the provisions of the Energy Charter. It demands, inter alia, 
guarantees and predictability of sales (this means that priority 
is given to long-term contracts as a key factor in ensuring 
energy security), the protection of investments as well as “non-
discriminatory access to international energy markets” (which 
could clash with EU plans to separate supplies and distribution 
in the EU market). Another proposal concerns the obligation to 
co-ordinate energy policies, including infrastructure projects 
(Paszyc 2009).
62 Christof van Agt, Senior researcher at the CIEP, interview by 
author, 2 March 2010, The Hague, Netherlands.
63 In essence, the Russian side supported the Transit Protocol, as it 
better accommodates Russia’s strategic interests than Art. 7 of 
the ECT. After the failure of this ‘strategy’, the Transit Protocol 
remained unsigned.
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by the Baltics) is to look for a ‘specific agreement’ 
with Russia, without distancing the demands of 
this new agreement too far from those of the ECT. 
Other ‘specific agreements’, such as the agreement 
between Norway and the International Energy 
Agency could serve as a template. In any case, 
such an alternative agreement can only become 
possible if Moscow departs from its prejudice that 
the rest of the world has very few alternatives to 
secure its energy supply and therefore, that Russia 
does not need any legally binding agreements with 
the EU. 
While waiting for a real shift in Russia’s 
thinking to occur, the Baltic States are 
concentrating on the construction of the internal 
EU legal framework, which would be applied 
to external suppliers.64 They adopted the third 
Energy Liberalisation Package without any 
exceptions or transiting periods (Grajauskas 
2008). Russia has voiced its opposition to the 
clause and received strong support from eight 
EU countries led by France, Germany and Italy 
(Dimireva 2009). These countries refused to take 
the path of so called ‘full ownership unbundling’, 
in which a parent company sells its transmission 
networks to a different firm.65 Requirements for 
vertically integrated companies were softened: 
they were obliged to meet rather vague ‘effective 
unbundling’ and energy security criteria, which 
would be assessed by both national regulators and 
the European Commission (Grajauskas 2008). 
Although in practical terms the difference might 
prove to be not very significant66, the Baltic States 
64 The initial proposal by the Commission clearly stated the 
principle that any company from a third country would need 
to “demonstrably and unequivocally comply with the same 
unbundling requirements as EU companies”. This means that 
third countries, such as Russia, would need to make similar 
reforms in their home market, before companies from these 
countries could make any significant downstream asset purchases 
in the EU (Goldirova 2008).
65 Germany, Italy and France oppose the deal, as they all have 
national utility companies with substantial foreign ownership. 
The Netherlands took an action to secure strengthened protection 
for their own energy sector in a separate deal. The same was also 
done by Denmark, Sweden and the UK, making it impossible 
for the law to make it through the EU parliamentary process 
(Goldirova 2008).
66 According to the initial agreement, despite the need to enforce 
liberalisation measures at home, companies of a third country 
could, in ‘special’ cases, participate in the EU market anyway. 
are very much disappointed with this outcome. 
They argue that while the EU tries to address the 
reciprocity problem at the macroeconomic level by 
setting equal conditions for all representatives of 
the sector, Russia continues an effective policy at 
the microeconomic level, looking at specific deals 
beneficial to Russian companies. According to 
the Baltic States, being dubious about the need to 
unbundle EU energy companies in fact encourages 
Russian companies to increase pressure and to 
deal with different member states separately.67 
This kind of relationship goes back to the ‘barter 
reciprocity’ so unacceptable for the Baltic States, 
where energy assets become objects of barter 
exchange68, and have nothing to do with ‘mutual 
interdependence’ or ‘strategic reciprocity’. 
Now, third country companies are allowed to participate, unless 
a national regulator and the Commission decide otherwise (Grätz 
2009). 
67 As proof may serve Gazprom’s official claims that the Lithuanian 
decision to separate sales and transmission activities hurt its 
investment in the country and that implementation of ownership 
unbundling could cause disruptions of gas supply. For more 
details see: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-30/
gazprom-e-on-should-redirect-unbundling-complaints-to-eu-
lithuania-says.html , accessed 5 October 2010. 
68 For example, a country would allow Gazprom greater access to 
its energy market to be sure that its energy giants secure energy 
deals with Russian companies.
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Conclusions 
As was demonstrated in the first chapter of the 
paper, the Baltic States, together with Finland, 
are the only continental EU member states not 
integrated into the EU gas network and with only 
a modest connection to the EU electricity system. 
Due to the very slow progress in developing 
renewable energy, catastrophic energy efficiency 
and dependence on gas and oil imports from 
Russia, the Baltic States permanently face the 
threat of an energy shortage. It was also shown 
that the Baltic States often become the victims of 
the Russian government’s tactics to use its energy 
companies or their export strategies as a form of 
political leverage.69 
The second chapter demonstrated that the 
Baltic States have a more or less clear vision 
on what kind of common EU energy policy 
could help them by tackling the most serious 
challenges in energy security affairs. The top 
objective in this regard is to channel the Baltic’s 
worries and proposals to the bigger EU member 
states and to in this way speed up the creation of 
functioning EU electricity and gas markets and 
the diversification of resource supply. Practically 
it means the creation of a legal framework for 
diminishing monopolists’ power and support 
in developing strategic infrastructure projects, 
such as electricity and gas interconnections with 
Western and Northern Europe. 
In creating a functioning EU electricity and gas 
market, the Baltic States are trying to convince all 
EU member states to live up to the letter of the 
document “Energy Policy for Europe”, which puts 
“a truly competitive, interconnected and single 
Europe-wide internal energy market” at the heart 
of Europe’s energy policy (European Commission 
2007). As far as diversification is concerned, 
the Baltic States encourage the EU to take 
69 The easiest and most common way to manipulate the internal 
political situation in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia is by 
supporting local (but close to Gazprom or other Russian 
monopolies) energy companies or businessmen who are asked 
to ‘invest’ their financial surplus into local politicians or political 
parties. Subsequently, these political actors, if they gain political 
power, back the decisions favourable to the Russian government 
or Gazprom (Makaraityte 2010).
responsibility and develop external relations with 
potential oil and gas suppliers and transit countries 
from Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, Central 
Asia and the Middle East.
However, despite the Baltic States’ hopes for 
a common European voice and despite positive 
public opinion in the entire EU70, governments 
and private companies in Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, France, Finland or Denmark prefer 
to deal with the external energy suppliers on 
a bilateral basis. These countries, which are 
crucial to the common EU energy policy, tend 
to believe that bilateral cooperation is more 
effective for securing sufficient energy supply. 
As was also shown, many EU governments 
consider a common EU external energy security 
policy, including a common vision towards EU-
Russia energy relations, as ineffective and worry 
primarily about the possibility of ‘engaging’ and 
‘modernising’ undemocratic suppliers in order to 
avoid gas supply disruptions in the future. In this 
regard, the Baltic States are advised to concentrate 
on national and regional non-political, but 
economically highly beneficial measures, such as 
informing people on effective consumption habits, 
setting up a framework for developing alternative 
energy resources, integrating national electricity 
and gas markets and constructing certain energy 
infrastructure objects.71 
Nevertheless, the Baltic States hope to make 
use of the fact that they have participated in the 
common EU energy policy from the very beginning. 
70 According to an opinion poll carried out for the European 
Commission in 2005,  47% of the respondents from all 27 EU 
member states support that decisions on key energy policy issues 
are taken at the European level, whereas 37% favoured decisions 
at the national and 8% at the local level (European Commission 
2005).
71 Petra Opitz, for instance, states that if there is the possibility 
to import electricity or gas from Belarus for the lowest price, 
this should be done. If Belarus or Russia are considered not to 
be fully reliable suppliers, then the Baltic States should make 
their domestic market attractive for investors who would be 
interested in building the electricity/gas grids/pipelines and 
profit from the energy resources import from Finland, Poland 
and other countries. A new NPP could be constructed if the 
Baltic States plan to build up an export strategy – this could be 
also interesting for investors. A decision on the construction of 
an LNG terminal should be built on the same logic – first of all it 
should be evaluated whether the market is big enough to sell the 
imported gas. Dr. Petra Opitz, Manager at DIW econ, interview 
by author, 18 December 2009, Berlin, Germany.
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Thus, despite repeated advice to concentrate on 
national efforts, the Baltic States hope instead to 
extend the reach of this very important area of 
‘common’ EU policy. Two conceptual directions 
of their strategy – establishing a common EU 
perception on ‘solidarity’ in energy affairs and 
application of the real ‘reciprocity’ principle within 
EU-Russia energy relations – were analysed in the 
third chapter. It was stressed that disputes related 
to ‘consumer solidarity’ arise first of all due to 
differences in the various national discourses 
and divergent views on how to implement this 
principle, but not because member states oppose 
the ‘solidarity’ idea as such. Nevertheless, it was 
concluded that the implementation of the principle 
of ‘consumer solidarity’, as it is understood by the 
Baltics, is of prime importance for the Baltic States 
if they hope to finance nationally or regionally 
important energy infrastructure development 
projects from the EU budget. 
As regards the debate on reciprocity, the status 
quo of EU-Russia energy relations according 
to the Baltic States can not be considered as 
strategic, predictable and equally beneficial for 
both parties in the partnership. The Baltic States 
argue that it represents asymmetrical producer-
consumer relations that neither boost the aspired 
modernisation and transformation of Russia 
nor oblige Russia to fulfil its commitments to 
supply Europe with the promised amount of gas. 
Therefore it would be in the interest of the EU to 
conclude a long term agreement on energy issues 
with Russia. However, the revival of, for instance, 
negotiations on the ECT is hardly possible, as 
Moscow perceives the ECT to be ‘not balanced’ 
and countervailing to Russian interests. The goal 
of the Baltic States in this regard is not to roll 
back Russian investment decisions, but to agree 
on some stricter terms of how the gas price is 
established, under which conditions Gazprom may 
invest, etc. In this context, this paper has argued 
that the main task for the Baltic States is to equate 
the attitude that the EU holds towards Gazprom’s 
monopolistic position with the attitude it holds 
towards, for instance, Microsoft and its monopoly 
in the IT sector.
The following policy recommendations 
(addressing the Baltic States’ governments) can 
be deduced from the analysis. First, in contrast 
to the cases of Western and Southern Europe, 
the EU has never had a debate regarding the 
interconnections with the Baltic States. Thus, soon 
after the EU begins investment in Nabucco, which 
is aimed to supply both Central and South Eastern 
Europe, or to deliberate the Caspian Development 
Cooperation, the Baltic States should point out the 
imbalance created by the focus on these projects 
and propose measures that will similarly benefit 
their situation of supply security.
Second, the Baltic States should base their 
motivation on reasons of market structure 
and present the desired energy infrastructure 
development projects as enabling a competitive 
market structure. In other words, they should 
explain to their partners that the current market 
structure is such that some states experience a 
monopoly risk. Therefore new pipelines, LNG 
terminals or NPPs are needed not to get somebody 
out of the market, but are instead vital to keep 
prices within certain limits and avoid political 
influence. In this regard, the Baltic States could 
argue that even if the LNG terminal or gas 
interconnections options will be difficult to 
commercialise, this will not necessarily mean that 
someone is losing money. Rather, these assets will 
serve to definitively limit monopolists’ prices and 
thus benefit consumers. Indeed, this difference in 
prices may even make some non-viable projects 
viable. 
Third, in the spirit of solidarity the Baltic States 
should insist on a combination of two aspects: (a) 
physical energy interconnections and investments 
and (b) policies promoting competition and 
restricting market monopoly powers. This way, 
they could back the development of the external 
energy policy dimension and at the same time 
call for the application of competition and market 
rules.
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Annexe
Figure 1. Institutional structure of the EU-Russian Energy Dialogue
Source: Romanova 2009.
Figure 2. Index of national vulnerability to “Gazprom Supply Cuts”
Source: Dreyer/Erixon/Winkler 2010.
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Figure 3. Electricity import-export capacities of the Baltic States
Source: Naudužas 2009.
Figure 4. Gas pipelines in the Baltic States
Source: Veiderma 2005.
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Figure 5. European dependence on Russian gas
Source: Loskot-Strachota 2008.
Figure 6. Net imports / total consumption in the new EU member states
Source: Kaderjak 2007.
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Figures 7. Gas pipelines to Europe
Source: Jarosiewicz 2011. 
Source: Vashakmadze 2007.
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Source: Liuhto 2009. 
Figures 8: LNG import and consumption in Europe
LNG imports to Europe
Source: Energy Policy Research Foundation 2009.
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Pipeline and LNG net imports in the EU by countries of origin (in 2007, %)
Source: Kavalov/Hrvoje/Aliki 2009.
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